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Abstract 
 
This chapter investigates how political strategies interrelate populist rhetoric with memory 
issues. By looking at the case of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) from Romania, between 
2017-2019, this chapter reveals how the slide to populism, generated by cyclical confrontations 
with the rule of law institutions, steered the PSD to adopt conspirational beliefs and appeal to 
traumatic memories to frame the judiciary as the new Securitate. Through the use of discourse 
analysis and virtual ethnography, this chapter analyses party resolutions and political rallies. 
This chapter explains how the populist rhetoric created a new hegemonic narrative of the 
judiciary, by intersecting its values and symbolism with the memory of the former Securitate 
from the Communist period.  
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Introduction 
 
Between 2015-2019, the Romanian political scene witnessed a return to populism spearheaded 
by the rhetoric of the Social Democrat party (PSD), which was centred on strategic 
exploitations of the past to fix the problems of the present. Similar to other parties from Central 
and Eastern Europe, such as PiS (Poland), FIDESZ (Hungary) and ATAKA (Bulgaria), PSD, 
along with the Alliance of the European Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) developed a mixture 
of populist and institutionalist discourses to alter the rule of law institutions that threatened 
their power grip.  
Historically, the PSD governed Romania for much of the last three decades, with many 
leaders transitioning from the Communist party and establishing a clientelist network that 
exhorted a far-reaching sway in politics. Their ideological heritage and institutional grabbing 
prevented a coming to terms with the crimes of the Communist regime until 2006. The entry 
of Romania to the European Union in 2007 made the realisation and rehabilitation of a climate 
governed by the rule of law inevitable.  
The loss during the presidential election in 2014, and the emergence of a crisis in the 
health system, witnessed the emergence of a strongman, Liviu Dragnea. He went on to change 
PSD’s politics and policies. Entrenched in legal battles for corruption, Dragnea shifted PSD’s 
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narratives towards populism. To this, the PSD espoused strategic communication that 
transferred to its electorate a new hegemonic narrative vis-à-vis the legacy of Communism in 
the democratic age. During 2017-2019, notably, the coalition used memory in their fight 
against the judiciary. They did so by instrumentalising the trauma of the Securitate, as well as 
its symbolism, to invalidate the values of the judiciary to their benefit.   
 This chapter contends that the PSD-ALDE coalition instrumentalised a mixture of 
populist discourses and memory issues to construct a new hegemonic narrative that aimed to 
change people’s perception of the judiciary and obtain validation for their reform. Thus, this 
chapter adopts the conceptualisation of populism proposed by Kurt Weyland1 as a political 
strategy, “through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on 
direct, unmediated support from large numbers of followers”. This chapter will analyse via 
discourse analysis and virtual ethnography the PSD resolution “the Parallel and Illegitimate 
State” and the political rally “We want Prosperity, not Security(ate)” to determine how memory 
is instrumentalised in the present for political benefit. 
This chapter agrees that, “populism can thrive in an environment of tight party 
discipline and organisation”2. Therefore, this study perceives PSD, the biggest party in 
Romania and the heir of the Communist Party, as an analogous case study of party discipline 
and organisation. Scholars argue that populism as a political strategy centres on the politicians, 
historical preconditions and policies3. Hence, by selecting the PSD-ALDE coalition, this study 
will show how emergent politicians implement coherent strategies that serve to win and 
maintain power4. The chapter analyses how populist leaders implement new hegemonic 
narratives that change the mnemonic consensus concerning Communism to serve their policies 
in the present.  
Following this discussion, this chapter moves onwards by presenting the conceptual 
framework of memory politics. Afterwards, this chapter discusses the role of cultural traumas 
in the mnemonic process. In the third empirical discussion, the section highlights the factors 
that pushed the PSD-ALDE towards populism and to adopt Securitate’s memory as a political 
leitmotif. Next, this chapter concludes with a discussion of findings generated from the 
methodology adopted for this study. 
 
 
The “Collective” in Memory Politics 
 
 
1 See Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics“, 
Comparative Politics 34, no. 1 (2001): 14, https://doi.org/10.2307/422412; Kurt Weyland, Populism, ed. 
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.2. 
2 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2016), 29. 
3 Kirk A. Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 39, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511730245. 
4 Weyland, Populism, 1:59. 
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The past’s faults reverberate in the mirror of the present, especially in today’s political arena. 
Not many aspects are more salient for a political agent than the use of the past. Depending on 
how the political agent interprets the past and subsequently decides to bring it in the present, it 
may affect the people’s repository of collective memories. The focus in this chapter is on the 
conceptual underpinnings of memory politics from a collective perspective. Subsequently, this 
section layers the types of memory used in this study and describes the agency of those who 
instrumentalise it. 
This study adopts the conceptual framework of Confino5 vis-à-vis the politics of 
memory as to “who wants whom to remember what, and why?” Memory politics is a flexible 
procedure. The logic of communication entailed in the process aims to change the hegemonic 
narrative that became immovable in time. It does so by targeting particular entities within the 
political milieu and communicates to the people new memory narratives from which the agent 
who initiated the remembrance process is benefiting. From this perspective, scholars analysed 
the mechanisms of collective remembrance and underlined its importance concerning identity 
groups6. Others from the sociology of memory consider that the process of remembrance 
represents an attempt to come to terms with the past7. However, this study analyses how 
political agents and parties reinterpreted the past and constructed new hegemonic narratives for 
their benefit.  
Kubik and Bernhard8 underlined the importance to “focus on strategies that political 
actors employ to make others remember in certain specific ways and the effects of such 
mnemonic manipulations”. Given this situation, the agent pursues representations of the past 
that are referential for the community and, most importantly, which can be reinterpreted for 
one’s advantage. Romano and Raiford9 argue that “representations of the past can be mobilised 
to serve partisan purposes […] they can shape a nation’s sense of identity, build hegemony, or 
serve to shore up the political interests of the state; and they can certainly influence how people 
understand their world”. Suitably, mnemonic manipulation is employed by political agents who 
“deploy the past strategically, manipulating memory to legitimise their actions concerning 
formative events in the collective consciousness of their community”10. Kubik and Bernhard 
describe these sorts of actions as befitting memory warriors11. The communication logic 
adopted by these warriors reveals the contours of the discursive strategies that deliberately 
 
5 Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method”, The American Historical 
Review 102, no. 5 (1997): 1393, https://doi.org/10.2307/2171069. 
6 c.f. Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, New German Critique, no. 65 (1995): 125–133; 
Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures”, Sociological Theory 17, no. 3 (1999): 333–348. 
7 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, Representations, no. 26 (1989): 19, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2928520. 
8 Michael H. Bernhard and Jan Kubik, eds., Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and 
Commemoration (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014), 7. 
9 Renee Christine Romano and Leigh Raiford, The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory (University of 
Georgia Press, 2006), xxi. 
10 Hayden, M. (1992) quoted in Peter J. Verovšek, “Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past: 
The Politics of Memory as a Research Paradigm”, Politics, Groups, and Identities 4, no. 3 (July 2, 2016): 529–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2016.1167094. 
11 Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism, 11. 
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trigger a collective representation of memory in particular groups. When conceptualising 
“collective representation”, this chapter subscribes to what Eliasoph and Lichterman12 mean as 
“conventional vocabularies or moral narratives that put people’s motives into words and stories 
that others easily can apprehend”.  
The warriors use people’s social constructs of collective memories for their political 
benefit. People’s “understanding of the past has strategic, political, and ethical consequences. 
Contests over the meaning of the past are also contests over the meaning of the present and 
over ways of taking the past forward”13. Thus, understanding the strategic mechanisms via 
which the political agent anchors the past in one’s discourse not only “highlights the processual 
character of memory”14 but also may offer clues vis-à-vis what meaning is sought to be 
reinterpreted from history and “propagated in the present more widely or imposed on other 
members of society”15. Consequently, the mnemonic discourse follows to a certain extent “the 
Gramscian assumption that discourses shape the way people think and the role that leaders play 
in these debates”16.   
This chapter investigates how political actors, for their political benefit, frame particular 
mnemonic narratives, transfer them from the past into the present and reinstate an organic 
experience of collective memory. Kansteiner contends that “memories are at their most 
collective when they transcend the time and space of the events’ original occurrence”.17. 
Subsequently, Kubik and Bernhard18 argue “that remembering the past, particularly 
collectively, is always a political process”, while Maurantonio19 argues that “memory is 
political”. Accordingly, this study asserts that political agents count on the psychological 
significance of the particular memory they want to use within their discourses to influence 
people’s perception and political choice. The agents target both the people who experienced 
the memory within their lifetime and those who received it in cultural settings. They reckon 
how the people cognise the significance of the particular type of memory they deem worthwhile 
and frame it in the current state of affairs. The purpose is to make people understand and 
empathise with the meanings provided by the political agent.  
Nets-Zehngut20 identifies five types of collective memory. In parallel with the approach 
of Kubik and Bernhard, this study focuses on the “official memory” endorsed by political 
 
12 Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman, “Making Things Political” (Routledge, 2019), 470, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315267784-50. 
13 Katharine Hodgkin, Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2003), 1, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203391471. 
14 Joanna Jasiewicz, “When the Past Matters: Memory Politics and Ethnic Relations in Poland”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 38, no. 9 (July 15, 2015): 1576, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1005640. 
15 Richard Ned Lebow et al., The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Duke University Press, 2006), 13. 
16 Verovšek, “Collective Memory, Politics, and the Influence of the Past”, 13. 
17 Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies”, 
History and Theory 41, no. 2 (2002): 189. 
18 Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism, 3. 
19 Nicole Maurantonio, “The Politics of Memory”, The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication, August 24, 
2017, 3, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199793471.013.026. 
20 Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “The Passing of Time and the Collective Memory of Conflicts: The Case of Israel and the 
1948 Palestinian Exodus”, Peace & Change 37, no. 2 (2012): 254–55. 
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parties or other agents in the public space based on the “structural-institutional constraints of 
the political field in which they act”21. The modus operandi of the “official memory“ requires 
careful examination concerning how the political agent incorporates memory as a strategy to 
change the cadres of current institutions in the post-Communist space. The engagement with 
the past in the realm of politics is a selective and rational process that seeks to interconnect the 
cultural significances and symbolism of occurrences that have gained meaning over time for 
particular cultures. This study uses the types of mnemonic strategies adopted by the warrior to 
influence the narratives in current affairs.   
In her work, Nancy Wood “addresses several possible sources that ‘purposefully’ shape 
public memory, ranging from social groups to institutions”22. Similarly, Nets-Zehngut23 argues 
that the effective manipulation of the past “caused through activities of various institutions” is 
a conscious and deliberate manipulation in the interest of the present. For example, memories 
of Communist institutions still play an active role in Eastern Europe’s politics. Hence, their 
symbols are still employed recurrently in the playbook of political actors. The frequent usage 
of Communism by political actors makes “Communism a useful political resource”24 given its 
traumatic meaning for some communities.  
The field of memory politics is particularly crucial for mnemonic warriors because they 
can select discursively and intentionally the memories of the past and attach it to their 
opponents who are embodied either by parties or institutions that prevent warriors from power-
grabbing. As Kubik and Bernhard relate, their only problem is “to make others [e.g., the people] 
accept their ‘true’ vision of the past”25 because, as Benhabib argues, “a story that is not well 
told will not be remembered”26.  
For the agent’s political purposes, memories are strategic arguments that can be 
transferred in the present narratives. In particular, mnemonic actors seek to vilify the image of 
political opponents and highlight their failures as part of an extension of memory nowadays. 
The mnemonic actor intentionally wants people to know that the memory and the human 
agency of those who committed it reverberate in the present. Nancy Wood in her work 
describes it as such27: 
 
The emanation of individual memory is primarily subject to the laws of the 
unconscious, public memory – whatever its unconscious vicissitudes – testifies to a 
will or desire on the part of some social group or disposition of power to select and 
organise representations of the past so that these will be embraced by individuals as 
 
21 Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism, 12. 
22 in Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies”, 188. 
23 Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Changes in the Historical Memory of 
Israelis/Jews 1949-2004”, Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 326, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310396112. 
24 Kate Korycki, “Memory, Party Politics, and Post-Transition Space: The Case of Poland”, East European Politics 
and Societies: And Cultures 31, no. 3 (August 2017): 519, https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325417700263. 
25 Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism, 26. 
26 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 102. 
27 Nancy Wood, Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe (Bloomsbury Academic, 1999), 2. 
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their own. If particular representations of the past have permeated the public 
domains, it is because they embody an intentionality – social, political, institutional 
and so on – that promotes or authorises their entry. 
 
The intended purpose of reenacting the memories through a surfeit of social and discursive 
strategies is to convey upon the opponents’ values the same mnemonic identity that affected 
the past of the people. Nets-Zehngut admits that memory’s role is to “shape the psychological 
reactions of each party negatively towards the rival and positively the in-group”28. As such, 
people can associate the values of the traumatic experiences of the past with the current political 
parties, politicians or institutions which had their values altered by the strategic discourse of 
the mnemonic warrior. The collective memory’s broader purpose is to distract people from the 
primary objectives of the political agent, downgrade the trust in other parties and institutions, 
and incriminate the opponents as successors of the agency that created the memory. Kubik and 
Bernhard worryingly remarked that, “from there it is a short step to prioritising substantive 
outcomes to the detriment of the procedural norms of democracy”29. Henceforward, this study 
looks at the case of Romania and examines how political agents associated in aide-mémoire 
contexts the image and values of the former Securitate. 
 
 
The cultural trauma of Securitate 
 
This section examines how the mnemonic aspects of cultural traumas ensure strategic salience 
in the populist rhetoric. Before that, the chapter will chart how the myth of Securitate – this 
study’s understanding of cultural trauma – was perpetuated in Romania after the democratic 
transition.  
Cultural traumas have a distinct role within the conceptualisation of memory. 
Alexander30 suggests that cultural traumas are processes of representation, whereby collective 
groups define a situation from the past. Others31 have specified that cultural trauma “functions 
as a discursive knot in contemporary culture due to its vast associative powers of generating 
interactions between disparate ideas”. The concept of trauma, some believe, “neither captures 
nor illuminates the forces that contribute to the making and unmaking of collective 
memories”32. Smelser33 adds to this debate, perhaps, the most holistic definition: 
 
 
 
28 Nets-Zehngut, “The Passing of Time and the Collective Memory of Conflicts”, 255. 
29 Twenty Years after Communism, 290. 
30 Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (Univ of California Press, 2004). 
31 Anne Rothe, Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media (Rutgers University Press, 
2011), 4. 
32 Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies”, 187. 
33 Neil J. Smelser, “Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma”, Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity 4 
(2004): 44. 
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Cultural trauma is a memory accepted or given credence by a relevant membership 
group and evoking an event or situation which is (a) laden with negative affect, (b) 
represented as indelible, and (c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or 
violating one or more of its fundamental cultural pre-suppositions. 
 
Cultural traumas can function as harmful stylistic elements in populist discourses. Their role is 
to amplify the psychological significance of the occurrences that caused harm in the past to 
particular groups. Naturally, traumas are rearticulated as symbols that fashioned the current 
collective identity of the society as a whole. Through constructions expressed in the media and 
politics, the symbolic composition of the trauma is perpetuated. This study focuses on the 
Communist institutions, specifically at the role of the Romanian Securitate. The Securitate was 
the popular name given to the Department of State Security. The latter was a general 
intelligence surveillance unit formed after the Communist regime took control of Romania. Its 
role was to silence any societal dissent during the Dej and Ceaușescu regimes34. 
The perpetuation of the Securitate memory is attached to the procedures that follow the 
transition to democracy. It enables its citizens to come to terms with the past via mnemonic 
processes that reenact the context of the painful experience. The transition to democracy also 
permitted a reinterpretative process of challenging the accepted hegemonic narratives, even by 
those with ties to the Communist regime. Such processes perpetuated the myth and symbols 
attributed to past trauma across generations. As an illustration, after the fall of Communism, 
and as a requirement to admission to the European Union, Romania established transitional 
justice trials35. Their role was to come to terms with the oppressive past, by revealing the 
regime crimes that were hidden heretofore36. However, dealing with the oppressive past means 
preserving the narratives that retain the memory of the trauma alive. In Romania, the 
perpetuation of the Securitate was kept threefold. 
First, the myth was preserved by the peculiar transition of communist institutions to 
democratic settings, which enabled many of the former communist elites to work in democratic 
institutions, without being discovered until later years37. The irregular reforms adopted by the 
democratic Romanian governments did not affect the power structures that were constructed 
after Communism fell, mainly the intelligence services. The old vanguard preserved its 
decision-making in the new institutions of the state. As democracy strengthened in Romania, 
former communists were discovered by new procedures. Such processes continued even after 
 
34 see both Dennis Deletant, “The Securitate and the Police State in Romania: 1948–64”, Intelligence and 
National Security 8, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529308432223; Dennis 
Deletant, “The Securitate and the Police State in Romania, 1964–89”, Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 
1 (January 1, 1994): 22–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529408432238. 
35 see Lavinia Stan, Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania: The Politics of Memory (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139104227. 
36 Monica Ciobanu, “Criminalising the Past and Reconstructing Collective Memory: The Romanian Truth 
Commission”, Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 313–36, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802630870. 
37 see Dennis Deletant, “Ghosts from the Past: Successors to the Securitate in Post-Communist Romania”, in 
Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, ed. Duncan Light and David Phinnemore (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001), 159–210, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333977910_3. 
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Romania’s entry in the EU, as the independence of its judiciary crystalised. The development 
of the rule of law institutions was associated by the PSD-ALDE coalition with the former 
Securitate institutions as soon as they felt threatened by indictments.  
 Second, the Tismăneanu report38 and the investigations of the National Council for 
Studying the Securitate Archives (CNSAS) were the prime vectors in dealing with the past and 
rediscovering the truth about the Communist regime. In the words of Rusu,39 “emancipation 
from the grip of the past is achieved simply by telling the truth about the horrors of the former 
regime”. The report investigated the crimes of the former Communist regime and exposed that 
much of the vanguard had transitioned to democracy straightforwardly. In the process, many 
Communist elites became rich during the first chaotic years of Romania’s adherence to the 
market economy. They did so by taking hold of the state’s major industries, entered politics or 
financed parties to assert their sway40. 
Confronting the truth about the past, notably through the Tismăneanu report’s findings, 
accomplished three purposes. First, it reenacted the memory of the Securitate in the public 
consciousness, as a factor that changed public identity. Second, the decision to investigate 
Communism through the report reactivated the meaning-making of the regime’s memories and 
its institutions like Securitate as political leitmotifs41. Third, it “identified the guilty [and] 
promoted the principle of accountability [and] gave President Traian Băsescu, who appointed 
the commission and endorsed its report, further impetus to pursue institutional reforms based 
on the rule of law”42. Hitherto the release of the report, the former Communist elites who 
transitioned to democracy preferred what scholars refer to as the “elusive strategy”, by trying 
to bury the difficult past in collective oblivion through the “politics of amnesia”43. However, 
the report annulled the “politics of amnesia” that the old vanguard hoped, making the past a 
political strand that had to be confronted, as all emergent political forces were able to be linked 
with the Communist regime.  
Last, the third category that perpetuated the myth of the Securitate and sedimented it in 
the democratic age were political scandals that debunked how the past and the new intelligence 
community amalgamated in the democratic regime. Examples, in this case, were the discovery 
of the under-cover Securitate officers that instigated and led the 1991 Mineriade44. Called by 
Ion Iliescu, a former Communist elite, the miners violently crushed the Bucharest protesters 
 
38 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Final Report - The Presidential Commission for the analysis and investigation of the 
Communist Regime - Romania (Humanitas, 2007). 
39 Mihai Stelian Rusu, “Transitional Politics of Memory: Political Strategies of Managing the Past in Post-
Communist Romania”, Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 8 (September 14, 2017): 1262, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2017.1380783. 
40 c.f. Tom Gallagher, Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the 
Theft of a Nation (New York: University Press, 2005). 
41 see Vladimir Tismăneanu and Marius Stan, Romania Confronts Its Communist Past: Democracy, Memory, 
and Moral Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139198929. 
42 Monica Ciobanu, “Conclusion: Post-Communist Romania at Twenty-Five and Hopes for the Future”, in Post-
Communist Romania at Twenty-Five: Linking Past, Present, and Future. Edited by Lavinia Stan and Diane 
Vancea. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015)265.  
43 Rusu, “Transitional Politics of Memory”, 1259. 
44 Deletant, “Ghosts from the Past”, 219. 
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who demanded that democracy be installed in Romania by those with no ties to Communism45. 
Other examples that kept the hegemonic narrative of the Securitate alive are the trials of the 
former Communist prison torturer Alexandru Vișinescu,46 and the exposing of many plutocrats, 
such as Dan Voiculescu, as informants to the Securitate. The memory was kept alive by the 
troubling unmasking of journalists like Robert Turcescu, who was an undercover agent for the 
intelligence services47. All the factors underlined in the above prolonged the consensual 
hegemonic narrative of the Securitate as a meaning-making dynamic that affected Romanian 
society. 
However, what distinguished the perpetuation of the Securitate myth were the protocols 
between the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) and the Romanian Secret Services 
(SRI) in 2018, which “organised wiretaps for DNA in the cases the agency was 
investigating”48. At this juncture, the least reformed of the state agencies, the SRI, was 
discovered to have conducted more than a quarter of a million wiretaps between 2005 and 
201449. Such procedures from the least responsible agency allowed its officers to “compromise 
politicians and judges by handpicking which of them would be handed over to the DNA or 
would be reserved for blackmail and extortion”50. The revelation of this case tarnished the 
name of the DNA and fuelled the populist speechmaking of PSD-ALDE, who had already 
began in 2017 “to modify the Penal Code under a pretext of fixing the problems of 
overcrowding of prisons in Romania”51. The protocols were stressed in the public arena as 
practices of the former Securitate by the PSD-ALDE members who were charged with 
corruption. The revelations fuelled their populist narrative and policymaking to demand 
reforms for the rule of law institutions, but not for SRI, which remained untouched.  
The cherry-picking of the judiciary institutions and not of the SRI, as the scapegoat for 
the reforms, was adequate for the PSD and ALDE leaders who faced corruption charges. Now 
that the context was possible for their proposed changes, the political strategy needed to be 
polished and disseminated in the public arena. It began by reactivating the myth of Securitate 
as a cultural trauma and associated it with DNA’s practices. Moreover, it changed the 
conventional settings with a new hegemonic narrative that suited the political purposes of 
political agents. Thus, this chapter layers the case of Romania during 2017-2019, when the 
memory of Securitate is introduced in the public arena as part of the strategic political 
 
45 Romania Confronts Its Communist Past, 35. 
46 Peter Janku, “Dungeon of Silence: Romania’s Struggle with the Past | DW | 10.02.2016”, DW.COM, 2016, 
https://www.dw.com/en/dungeon-of-silence-romanias-struggle-with-the-past/a-19041240. Article accessed 
May 2020. 
47 Dennis Deletant, “Romania’s Commitment to the Rule of law?” in Post-Communist Romania at Twenty-Five: 
Linking Past, Present, and Future. Edited by Lavinia Stan and Diane Vancea. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 
2015)234.  
48 Andi Hoxhaj, The EU Anti-Corruption Report: A Reflexive Governance Approach (Routledge, 2019), 141. 
49 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Romania’s Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism”, Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 
(2018): 124, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0048. 
50 Hoxhaj, The EU Anti-Corruption Report, 141. 
51 Hoxhaj, 140. 
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communication of the PSD and ALDE coalition, which sought to alter and demonise the image 
of the judiciary. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The emphasis of PSD and ALDE on the Securitate memory and the rule of law institutions 
between 2017-2019 had implications for the nature of the narratives propagated in the public 
arena. On the one hand, it sedimented and redeployed the memory of Securitate as a traumatic 
factor that changed the national identity of Romanians. On the other hand, it reconfirmed the 
image of Securitate being active in the democratic transition and transferred it on the structures 
of the judiciary and opposition parties to legitimise their reforming actions. This is a populist 
communicational strategy, as it instrumentalises the traumatic experiences through a new 
hegemonic narrative espoused in speeches and statements.  
Thus, this study conducted a discourse analysis of the speeches of the PSD and ALDE 
from 2017 to 2019 inspired by the work of Kaya and Tecmen52 on the Justice and Development 
Party (JDP) in Turkey. Using a novel approach that combined the virtual ethnography53 of 
digital images and videos of political rallies, this study analysed how the narratives were 
structured in different stages and how the mnemonic elements were instrumentalised in 
populist rhetoric. The research provided the contextual framework for articulating the 
alliance’s populist discourse, leading to the identification of memory and cultural trauma as 
critical elements of the discourse. Thereby, the Communist past, encompassing the Securitate 
memory and its propagation as a cultural trauma in the democratic transition, acts as a 
noteworthy component in the populist communication strategy. By doing so, it provided 
salience for amending and “othering” the judiciary.                
 
 
PSD: “The party of power” 
 
In 2014, a political commentator noted: “Romanian politics is not about ideology, about left or 
right. All our political battles are about corruption and the rule of law”54. Thirty years after 
Communism, the battles about corruption and the rule of law are affecting democracy55. 
 
52 Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen, “The Use of the Past in Populist Political Discourse: Justice and Development 
Party Rule in Turkey” (Routledge, 2020), 69–91, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429454813-4. 
53 Christine Hine, Virtual Ethnography (London ; Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2000).  
54 Andrew Higgins, “Spy Allegations in a Presidential Race Conjure Romania’s Authoritarian Past”, The New 
York Times, October 31, 2014, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/europe/presidential-
candidates-spy-allegations-in-romania-conjure-a-dystopian-past.html. Article accessed June 2020. 
55 Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg, eds., “Autocratization Surges–Resistance Grows DEMOCRACY 
REPORT 2020 | Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)” (V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, 2020), 
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Overall, Romania’s transition to democracy has been an uneven road peppered with countless 
events that postponed the changeover to a robust democracy. Scholars warned that 
“Communism robbed societies of their trust in institutions beyond the family or other highly 
personalised networks”56. Others cautioned that “the post-Communist legacies would haunt the 
region even after the democratic systems and rule of law were instituted”57. These words 
accurately relay what would become the case in Romania. In black and white, they describe 
the hopes of Romanians to have a Western-style democracy. Such wishes were shattered by a 
nefarious stream of political episodes that postponed the expectations of the 1989 Revolution58 
and which set the trend for years to come59. Two factors hindered the democratic transition in 
Romania. First, the slow process of coming to terms with the Communist past. Second, the 
means by which the communist elite transitioned into Social-Democratic parties. The old-
vanguard formed clientelist networks who exploited the legal confusion, profiteered from the 
post-1989 “jungle economy”, and sabotaged the independence of the rule of law institutions in 
time60.  
Kubik and Bernhard61 describe the PSD as a “party of power […] as their functionaries, 
almost all of them ex-communists can convert their positions of power in the party-state into 
institutions of influence in the post-communist economy and politics”. PSD, “the direct 
descended of the Communist Party”62 evolved in time as FSN (e.g., National Salvation Fond – 
1992-1996) to PSDR (e.g., the Romanian Socialist Democrat Party 1996-2001) to its current 
form PSD (2001-ongoing). In the aftermath of the 1989 Revolution, the PSD became the 
biggest Romanian party helped by the “second-level echelon of communist apparatchiks and 
elements of Ceaușescu’s Securitate”63. Dressing the successors’ mantle, the socialists were 
“able to control the struggle over memory [until] issues of public memory became depoliticised 
by a political and mnemonic actor [who perceived] an advantage in challenging the mnemonic 
consensus”64. Having won most of the post-1989 elections, PSD left unaddressed the crimes 
and abuses of the Communist regime, as it endangered the structure of its clientelist network. 
Instead, they focused along with moguls like Dan Voiculescu to discredit the reforms and 
mounted constant pressures that derailed the judiciary’s development. Gallagher argues that, 
 
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f0/5d/f05d46d8-626f-4b20-8e4e-
53d4b134bfcb/democracy_report_2020_low.pdf. Link accessed June 2020. 
56 Deletant, “Romania’s Commitment to the Rule of law?”, 224. 
57 Schöpflin, 1993, quoted in Emilia Palonen, “Performing the Nation: The Janus-faced Populist Foundations of 
Illiberalism in Hungary“, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 26, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 310, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2018.1498776. 
58 Peter Siani-Davies, The Romanian Revolution of December 1989 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
59 c.f. Alison Abbott, “Romania after the Ceaușescus”, Nature; London 372, no. 6507 (December 15, 1994): 605, 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.uio.no/10.1038/372605a0; Stephen D Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution., 
2004, http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=201168. 
60 Deletant, “Romania’s Commitment to the Rule of law?” 221. 
61 Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism, 26. 
62 Ciobanu, “Conclusion: Post-Communist Romania at Twenty-Five and Hopes for the Future”, 260. 
63 Ciobanu, 262. 
64 Twenty Years after Communism, 29. 
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“the justice was seen hugely problematic for the PSD”65. Despite targeting politicians from 
both ideological aisles, the DNA’s significant anti-corruption victories included the conviction 
of a former PSD PM, several ministers and regional politicians66. After failing to change the 
judiciary in 2012, the PSD resumed its actions in 2017 under a new mnemonic actor facing 
criminal charges. Unlike the nationalist playbook of 2012, the PSD tuned into a populist 
strategy that “othered” the judiciary. 
Between 2015-2019, the PSD was run by an emergent politician, i.e., Liviu Dragnea, 
who brought victory in the 2016 parliamentary election, despite having a criminal record. PSD 
won the election on a campaign platform that included a Europeanist discourse, economic 
reforms and social justice for the lower echelons of society. Like the populist literature 
suggests, during the 2016 election, the PSD was primarily supported by the poor areas of the 
society67 and by those who wanted to transition to new political attachments68. Despite securing 
a majority with ALDE in parliament, the focus shifted from the electoral platform to the 
judiciary, mainly because its leadership was entrenched in legal trials. Mungiu-Pippidi argues69 
that corruption was more prevalent among the PSD because “this party, having been in control 
for most of the transition, was indeed more corrupt”. Successive prosecutions of PSD members 
hardened the party’s position towards reforming the judiciary.  
The parliamentarian majority obtained by the PSD-ALDE in 2016 permitted leeway to 
amend the judiciary. They did so through a mixture of populist and institutionalist discourses, 
supplemented by emergency ordinances (OUG)70. However, such processes were 
controversial, especially after the 2012 attempt, which drew the EU’s attention and civil 
society. The latter perceived the PSD’s actions as political undertakings that shielded its leaders 
from prosecution. Consequently, in 2016, civil society created a new party, the Save Romania 
Union (USR), which provided new opposition to mainstream parties. In 2018, the former 
technocrat PM Dacian Cioloș (2015-2017), whose tenure was used as a scapegoat during the 
2016 elections by the PSD, formed the Freedom, Unity and Solidarity Party (PLUS+). The 
PSD-ALDE narratives represented both parties as creations of the Securitate71. 
The emergency ordinances (OUG) acted as a shortcut that bypassed parliament’s 
approval, created instability72 and drew criticism from the EU. Therefore, to muster public 
support, the PSD imported the conspiracy theory of a parallel state, while refreshing the public 
 
65 Gallagher, “Unsocial Democrats: The PSD’s Negative Role in Romania’s Democracy”, 177. 
66 Mungiu-Pippidi, “Romania’s Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism”, 105. 
67 Kaya and Tecmen, “The Use of the Past in Populist Political Discourse”, 72. 
68 Mabel Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times: Culture, Security and Populism in the New Europe 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/10968. 
69 Mungiu-Pippidi, “Romania’s Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism”, 108. 
70 Ionut Chiruta, “Challenging the Rule of law in Romania: The Metamorphosis of Political Discourse towards 
Populism”, Forthcoming, 2020. 
71 Loredana Voiculescu, “Liviu Dragnea vede securiști și în stânga, și în dreapta: “Securiștii și-au făcut două 
partide“, Republica, 2019, https://republica.ro/liviu-dragnea-vede-securisti-si-in-stanga-si-in-dreapta-
zsecuristii-si-au-facut-doua-partide. Article accessed June 2020. 
72 Mungiu-Pippidi, “Romania’s Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism”, 113. 
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discourse with references to the Securitate. It aimed to change the perception of the public vis-
à-vis the judiciary and imposed a new hegemonic narrative. 
Separately, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, a centre-right party, was formed 
from the splinter cells of the Liberal Reformist Party (PLR) and Voiculescu’s Conservative 
party (PC) in 2015 under the leadership of Călin Popescu Tăriceanu. During the 2016 elections, 
ALDE received 5.6% of the vote and signed an accord with the PSD to join the coalition as a 
junior partner73. Tăriceanu, a former rogue PM from the time of President Băsescu, with a 
history of intervening on behalf of the oligarchs74, was saved during a vote in the Senate, which 
granted him immunity from prosecution, despite being indicted for taking bribes in 2018 by 
the DNA. Suddenly, the leaders of the ruling coalition were being prosecuted by the judiciary. 
Both leaders would change the nature of the institutions in the parliament. Both attempted to 
diminish society’s trust in the rule of law institutions by using Securitate’s memory and 
symbolism against the judiciary. The commitment of the alliance to change the narratives 
related to the judiciary, by stimulating society to re-engage the fears felt during the Communist 
regime, brought the parties into the populist narratives.   
 
 
PSD’s swing into populist narratives  
 
In the thirty years since Romania has transitioned to democracy, PSD has governed for twenty-
two years. During its time, it derailed the findings of the Tismăneanu report75 and shouldered 
the efforts to disrupt the reforms of the judiciary. PSD preserved its Communist heritage, by 
shielding the elites who transitioned into politics. During the Dragnea era, the populist 
discourse reached its high points76. In its attempt to explain to its electorate the social 
movements like #Rezist who protested against anti-corruption77 or political movements like 
the Save Romania Union (USR), PSD adopted conspiracy theories. Like FIDESZ from 
Hungary, the George Soros campaign theme was introduced by party-friendly media 
organisations, such as Antena 3. After massive protests, supported by civil society, led to the 
repeal of the first legislation that amended the Penal Code on 31 January 2017, the PSD-ALDE 
alliance began to favour another populist incentive, i.e., polarisation. The coalition proposed a 
dichotomy, on the one hand, between the youths who protested, as agents paid by George Soros 
and, on the other hand, its electorate, which supposedly supported the judiciary reform.  
 
73 “Romania’s PSD and ALDE Sign Coalition Protocol”, Romania Insider, accessed June 6, 2020, 
https://www.romania-insider.com/romanias-psd-alde-sign-coalition-protocol. 
74 Adriana Saftoiu, Cronica de Cotroceni (Iasi: Polirom, 2015), 247. 
75 Tismaneanu and Stan, Romania Confronts Its Communist Past. 
76 Chiruta, “Challenging the Rule of law in Romania: The Metamorphosis of Political Discourse towards 
Populism”. 
77 Ana Adi and Darren Lilleker, “#rezist – Romania’s 2017 Anti-Corruption Protests: Causes, Development and 
Implications”, Monograph (Berlin, Germany: Quadriga University, July 20, 2017), 
http://www.romanianprotests.info/. Link accessed June 2020. 
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Such intense polarisation did not make sense for a centre-left party. Despite PSD 
emerging from the 90s with a political platform captured by local capitalists that encapsulated 
a social-democrat ideology, the party nevertheless implemented a neo-liberal agenda78. PSD’s 
ideology included social justice and social solidarity, pluralism and pro-European values. With 
such a platform, PSD rallied the disenfranchised and economically marginalised Communist-
era workers, who felt the growing fears and inequalities in the new democratic era. However, 
the clientelist network of the party and regional barons that captured entire counties taunted the 
structure of the PSD in 2015, when the party elected as its leader, Liviu Dragnea, a politician 
with a criminal record.  
The election of Dragnea proved how much political clientelism had come to dominate 
the PSD’s internal affairs. Many political sponsors and local barons supported the election of 
Dragnea because his legal troubles resembled theirs. Before Romania entered the EU, much of 
the funds distributed by the European Commission79 for regional development were siphoned 
by local politicians like Dragnea, for which he was indicted in 201780. Accession to the EU, 
the failure of Victor Ponta in 2012 to undermine the progress of the judiciary81 and the loss 
during the 2014 presidential elections to the incumbent Klaus Iohannis led to the party’s 
transition into the hands of a strongman that might safeguard the barons’ fortunes. After his 
elections, Dragnea brought victory for the PSD in the 2016 elections, based on a manifesto that 
connected both left and right, partly because the party wanted to appeal to young people and 
because it wanted its association with the Communist memory to disappear. However, two 
consecutive trials of Dragnea in 2016 entrenched the socialist leader and prompted him to seek 
opportunities in populist narratives to benefit his position.  
In 2017, pressure from civil society and the judiciary revitalised an institutional 
polarisation between the party and the rule of law institutions. Securitate’s revitalisation 
seemed opportunistic for the PSD, as the party dived further into populist narratives by 
appealing to conspiracy theories. The revival of the Securitate myth was part of a broader 
strategy that aimed to convince Romanians of an alternative reality, whereby the judiciary was 
the new Securitate. The strategy began on 17 November 2017, with the resolution “the Parallel 
State and Illegitimate”, a conceptual thesis of politicians with legal issues. Through this new 
narrative, PSD appealed to Romanians to take to the streets and fight the so-called parallel state 
– a leitmotif expressed during future political rallies. In its resolution, PSD underlines the 
motifs of why such a parallel state existed: 
 
 
 
78 Liviu Dragnea, “Mitingul PSD Din Piața Victoriei, București - 09.06.2018”, June 9, 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=etGzQ_ykbb8. 
79 Gallagher, Modern Romania. 
80 Sophie Balay, “Romanian Politician Indicted for EU Funds Fraud”, November 14, 2017, 
https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/7256-romanian-politician-indicted-for-eu-funds-fraud. Link accessed June 
2020. 
81 Vladimir Tismaneanu, “DEMOCRACY ON THE BRINK: A Coup Attempt Fails in Romania”, World Affairs 175, 
no. 5 (2013): 83–87. 
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[…] PSD analysed the tense situation present in the public space due to the numerous 
information about the serious abuses of some persons who activate, have led or still 
lead public institutions of force and which indicate the existence of a so-called 
“Parallel and Illegitimate State”, which seeks to take control of political power 
legitimately constituted by free and fair elections, posing a danger of concern to public 
opinion. PSD notes several vulnerabilities of the rule of law, which are speculated by 
the exponents of the “Parallel and Illegitimate State” to control the political power or 
the judiciary discretionarily. […] The Parallel and Illegitimate State uses public financial 
resources and tools specific to the state authority to intimidate, blackmail or remove 
political decision-makers who support or promote legislative changes aimed at 
restoring state powers to their constitutional core in line with democratic principles 
and fundamental human rights and freedoms. […] Moreover, the recent actions of the 
“Parallel and Illegitimate State”, disguised under the so-called “fight against 
corruption”, have as their blatant goal harassment and, ultimately, the beheading of 
the legitimately elected political power, because it not to be able to fulfil the 
Government Programme committed before the electorate. […] Therefore, out of the 
desire to have control over political power, the “Parallel and Illegitimate State” adopts 
anti-national and anti-citizen conduct and is prepared to block all public policies that 
increase people’s incomes, create jobs, support domestic capital and the reform of 
the judiciary82. 
 
The text of the resolution, although puzzling, presented the broader context for the 
revitalisation of the Securitate myth during the 2018 rally and 2019European election. The 
decision introduced another populist characteristic, i.e., the parallel state. Journalists critical of 
Dragnea believe that the term was borrowed from Erdogan’s repertoires83. In turn, this has been 
integrated from the US84. In Romania, the conspiracy’s strategic purpose was to eliminate the 
independence of the judiciary discursively and establish the context for a second decisional 
actor. Asked during the press statement if the resolution was about institutions, Dragnea stated 
“yes” and added: 
 
 
There has been talk in the public space about something like this for a long time, and 
everyone understands; it can be seen with the naked eye, honestly. […] The Parallel 
and Illegitimate State will disappear when it no longer has the tools that can interpret 
the laws that allow some to commit abuses85. 
 
 
82 read the full text here Iulia Rosca, “DOCUMENT PSD a adoptat o rezolutie impotriva’ statului paralel si 
ilegitim’ care consuma resursele financiare ale Romaniei: ‘Presedintele Klaus Iohannis isi incalca atributiile’ - 
Politic - HotNews.ro“, November 17, 2017, https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-22118258-document-psd-
adoptat-rezolutie-impotriva-statului-paralel-ilegitim-care-consuma-resursele-financiare-ale-romaniei-
presedintele-klaus-iohannis-isi-incalca-atributiile.htm. Link accessed June 2020.   
83 Marian Voicu, Matrioska Mincinosilor: Fake News, Manipulare, Populism (Humanitas SA, 2018). 
84 Mehtap Söyler, The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations, and Democracy, vol. 73, 
Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics (London: Routledge, 2015). 
85 Liviu Dragnea, “Liviu Dragnea, Mihai Tudose Şi Marian Neacşu După CExN al PSD - 17.11.2017”, November 
17, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0nFQ-M0fvyA. Link accessed June 2020. 
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The first sign of populism argues Müller86 is how the political actor diminishes the significance 
of the separation of powers. PSD, while claiming to be the only legitimate actor, underlined 
the anti-corruption fight as unjust/illegitimate. The decision to slide into populism after its 
institutional arrangements were kept in place by numerous checks and balances is a strategic 
decision because “populism forms a coherent political strategy that has often served for 
winning and maintaining power”87. 
This resolution resulted from two stimuli that forced the PSD leadership to change its 
political strategy, from institutional decision-makers to populist strands. First, the pressure 
from civil society forced PSD to repeal its amendment adopted in January 2017, which 
otherwise decriminalised abuse – a crime for which Dragnea was accused. Second, in 2017, 
Dragnea was charged by the DNA of fraud with European funds, based on information 
compiled by the European Anti-Fraud Office. These stimuli forced PSD to respond with a 
broader strategy. First, it constructed a context whereby an outside entity, not checked by public 
oversight, controlled the state’s institutions. Second, it created the incentive for a new story 
that revitalised the Securitate, by using both memory and mythology to manipulate public 
perception, vis-à-vis the values of the judiciary. 
The publication of the resolution three days after the DNA accused Dragnea of fraud 
with EU funds revealed the U-turn adopted by the party from institutional decision-making to 
populist strategies. Also, it encompassed conspirational thinking meant to convince the people 
of the necessity to amend the rule of law institutions. The resolution revealed that cyclical 
confrontations between the judiciary and embattled politicians have forced the latter to adopt 
new strategies to muster public support. Dragnea’s reference to time centres on the general 
understanding of the methods and mythology of the parallel state perpetuated in society. The 
tangible reference attested to the parallel state’s existence in institutions and their processes 
that affected Dragnea. The parallel state created the context under which the myth of Securitate 
survived in time, beyond public scrutiny.  
 
 
Old Vanguard, New Vanguard – Overlapping new hegemonic 
narratives during the ritualistic processes of political rallies 
 
The cultivation of the Securitate myth acted as a strategic deterrent for the PSD-ALDE 
coalition during their assault on the rule of law institutions. Much of the revitalisation of 
Securitate was achieved during June 2018. Twelve days before Dragnea was convicted for 
incitement to abuse, the PSD organised the rally “We want Prosperity, not Security(ate) / Noi 
vrem Prosperitate, nu Securitate”, on 9 June. Its purpose was to protest against the abuses 
committed by the judiciary and portray Dragnea as a victim of the new Securitate. The name 
 
86 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 
84–86. 
87 Weyland, Populism, 1:59. 
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of the rally strengthened the idea that Dragnea cultivated throughout the 2016 elections and 
during the 2017 resolution: namely, that prosperity and development are prevented by anti-
corruption efforts. The conceptual ambivalence between prosperity and security cultivated the 
populist idea of trading democratic principles for material wellbeing. 
Endorsed by an online campaign that encouraged street protests, PSD flexed its 
organisational skills and brought about 150,000 people, mostly old, by bus and train from its 
poor and regional strongholds to Bucharest. The rally’s political drive was to pressure the 
judiciary and impress the opposition vis-à-vis the party’s political cohesion, despite its leader 
being indicted. Most importantly, the rally’s purpose was to show the support it receives from 
the people – in the words of Dragnea, “the voice of the People must be heard outside of the 
Securitate propaganda, which wants to make us believe that we are few”.88 
The rally was organised in Victory Square (Piața Victorie) – the same site that saw the 
revolutionaries take down the Ceaușescu regime in 1989. The square signified the place where 
civil society protested against the laws that sought to revise justice in February 2017 and during 
the Diaspora #Rezist protests, which were violently crushed on 10 August. For PSD, reclaiming 
the square where protesters prevented the amendments was necessary for its political prowess. 
However, when picking the Square, the PSD considered the mnemonic significance the place 
has for society. Through a ritualistic takeover, the PSD tried to recreate and transfer to 2018 
the same mnemonic conditionality people felt during the 1989 Revolution. Nevertheless, this 
time, the revolutionaries were to wrestle against the New Securitate. 
Centred on a militaristic organisation, which is typical for a party with tight discipline 
and organisation, as the populism literature suggests, PSD imposed white shirts, white national 
costumes and national flags to convene a new revolutionary movement – one against the 
judiciary. The colour white was intended to signify purity and cleanliness. According to 
Dragnea: 
 
 
We chose white for today, for our rally, because white symbolises cleanliness and 
good people, and that is what we do. We are cleaning the country of the misery spread 
by these rats (judiciary). Someone told me we look like the white brigades. Even so, 
we are the white brigades, if necessary, because this is an open struggle. 
 
The open struggle held by the coalition during the rally was against the judiciary, which 
troubled both the leaders of the parties and other MPs. The recital during the rally was focused 
on uncovering the origins of the parallel state, which, retrospectively, created confusion via its 
conceptual underpinnings. The rally interrelated conspirational beliefs with mnemonic 
recollections to obtain salience. It attributed to the parallel state an identity and narrative that 
the people would recognise, i.e., Securitate. First, the chairman of ALDE, Tăriceanu, outlined 
the new hegemonic narrative vis-à-vis the Securitate. 
 
 
88 Liviu Dragnea, “Mitingul PSD Din Piața Victoriei, București - 09.06.2018”, June 9, 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=etGzQ_ykbb8. Link accessed June 2020. 
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If someone asks you why you are here, tell them that you are coming because we all 
made a mistake in believing that after 1989 we won our right to democracy and 
freedom […] Our democracy is threatened. Our freedom and independence are 
threatened. This is the ubiquitous parallel state from the political environment, from 
the media, from the judiciary. Today, I find that after 1989, our hopes for democracy 
to take root in Romania finally are not fulfilled. We must continue to fight until the 
healthy forces of legitimate democratic institutions defeat the sick forces, the obscure 
forces, the forces of darkness, the occult forces that have seized this country […] I am 
convinced that after 25 years you will not accept that the Securitate, so feared during 
the Communist time, has not died out and has merely changed. It wants to be more 
treacherous and dangerous in power than it has been before. The Securitate no longer 
has Soviet tanks behind it, but […] it listens to our phones, it watches us, and when we 
resist, it does everything possible to put us in prison. From 2008 until today, thousands 
of Romanians have fallen victims to the new Securitate. I’ll tell you something else. 
Democracy is said to be orphaned. Well, we have two parents of Securitate. You know 
both parents. One is called Traian Băsescu and the other Klaus Iohannis. Traian 
Băsescu created the new security, and Klaus Iohannis uses it against political 
opponents. 
 
Tăriceanu began by admitting that the 1989 narratives were deceitful, mentioning that it is a 
“mistake” to believe that what Romanians had hoped for after the regime tumbled had come to 
fruition. As in the populist literature, the liberal-democrat leader considered that democracy 
was defenceless and under siege by “occult forces”; therefore, these threats needed to be 
addressed by political agents, as the last form of defence. Tăriceanu sees how the enigmatic 
parallel state survived by infiltrating the pillars that separate powers from a democracy. The 
replacement of the public consensus vis-à-vis the Securitate is achieved when Tăriceanu 
claimed that the Securitate did not disappear but transitioned into the democratic regime. It 
intentionally recounted the memory contexts of Communism, by linking it with the Soviet past, 
whereby tanks acted as the democratic deterrents.  
 
 19 
 
 
Image 1. Images projected behind Tăriceanu that translate “down with the parallel state”; and on the right a picture with 
the revolutionary flag used in 1989. It says, “the people are the sovereign, and the revolution goes on”. 
Source: https://www.vice.com/ro/article/vbqxb4/cum-a-fost-miting-psd-bucuresti  
 
However, Tăriceanu reconnected the mnemonic tenets for which Securitate was feared during 
Communism, particularly, its surveillance techniques, and transferred it to the present day. 
Tăriceanu connected the mnemonic traumatic contexts of Securitate with the current situations 
by linking them with Băsescu and Iohannis, the former and current president of Romania, who 
ran on anti-corruption platforms. Tăriceanu’s purpose was to frame Securitate’s revival with 
the first year when Romania entered the EU. The transfer of memory was situated when 
Romania began its anti-corruption fight. Tăriceanu then employed a victimhood theme by 
recounting how the new Securitate, i.e., the judiciary, acted against political opponents who 
thought the anti-corruption battle was committing abuses.  
 Later during the rally, the narrative thread is handed to Liviu Dragnea. His speech, 
behind iconography that symbolised the parallel state/new Securitate which from the onset sets 
out to define and link the parallel state and Securitate conceptually:   
 
 
I was asked, as were other colleagues of mine, what the parallel state is that we are 
protesting against today? The answer is simple. It’s exactly as the name suggests. It is 
a system that uses state institutions illegally, outside and in parallel with democracy, 
out and in parallel with fundamental rights and freedoms; it also appears in parallel 
with the will expressed at the polling booths, in parallel with the rights and freedoms 
of each of us, in parallel with the Constitution. All these things can be summed up in 
one word, that is, Securitate. It has been three and a half years since the Băsescu 
regime, the one that built this system, left, but its tools have remained. […] corrupt 
prosecutors remained, […] the head of DNA remained, […] the generals are left […[ 
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undercover journalists remained, […] the undercover magistrates remained […] They 
speak today through the mouths of many opposition politicians, and they react today 
through their network of Securitate propaganda. Democracy is being attacked by 
them and by illegally-funded NGOs. […] It’s a vile brotherhood, a dangerous 
conspiracy, a contract that wants to take democracy out of the game. This is the 
portrait of the parallel state. We can call it whatever you want, the invisible state, the 
underground state, or you can call it very simply, the Securitate. […] This disease that 
is worse than in the old days of the Securitate, good people; and these are not 
propaganda words […] Let’s not envy them; and many like them who believe that if 
they are always using the term “anti-corruption” they will escape. They will not escape 
from captivity, and they cannot escape responsibility. They use the parallel state. They 
enjoy the so-called power that the parallel state gives them, but they are pathetic 
tools of these Securitate guards. 
 
The conceptual underpinning emphasised by Dragnea framed the illegality and unlawfulness 
of the entity, as opposed to democracy. As suggested by populist literature, the political actor 
struggles to mount the antithesis between we/us and the outsiders/elites. Dragnea strengthened 
his argument by connecting the populist context of crisis with democracy and personalising the 
abstract structure of institutions into the antagonists, destabilising the democratic process and 
causing human rights violations. By reducing the meaning-making of the parallel state that 
curtailed democratic principles and institutions, Dragnea focused its narrative strategy on 
connecting the collective memory of the people with the entity that is asymmetric to 
democracy, i.e., Securitate. The focus is on the actors who supported the anti-corruption fight: 
its founder, president Traian Băsescu, and the instruments of power that remained after his 
tenure.   
Unlike Tăriceanu, who identified the institutions that account for the separation of 
powers, as Securitate operatives, Dragnea added the common populist element of NGOs, as 
entities that destabilise democracies. Dragnea perceived this association with persuasive words 
such as “vile brotherhood, dangerous conspiracy” to correlate with their criminal procedures 
that seek to subvert democracy. Once again, Dragnea reduced the meaning-making of the 
context to identify the Securitate as the entity responsible for threatening democracy. Not only 
overlapping a new hegemonic narrative was enough to connect the mnemonic framework of 
the Securitate with the judiciary; he also recreated a mnemonic transfer of the symbols that 
embedded the Securitate collective memory like a trauma. 
 
 
Recreating the symbolism and language of Securitate in 
contemporary politics 
 
Populist actors give particular attention to the values and symbols that constitute one’s 
narrative framework, mainly one’s nemesis. For instance, once the image of its enemy is 
constructed, the populist actor embarks on defining its values and symbols. During the rally, 
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the speakers, supported by iconographic elements projected on the screen overlooking the 
audience, focused on correlating the mnemonic contexts for which Securitate was famous, i.e., 
surveillance and informants. Both leaders wanted this mnemonic recollection to be transferred 
and intersected with the practices of the judiciary. Both leaders compared and stressed the scale 
to which surveillance was conducted. According to Dragnea: 
 
 
There are still six million Romanians bewing monitored. There are secret protocols 
between the services and the prosecutor’s office, between the Securitate and the 
courts. Blackmail and threats remained […] We have all been, or are, or could be, or I 
could at some point be touched by the extended hand of this parallel state of these 
Securitate guards. Six million people were intercepted, tracked, monitored, recorded 
and supervised by the parallel state. It’s worse than we could have ever imagined. 
Look at the one on your left; look at the one on your right. At least one of them was 
listed to or intercepted. It is likely that you are among the six million Romanians whose 
rights and freedoms have been violated. 6 million, over two-thirds of the active 
population of this country. It is too much; it is unacceptable; it is intolerable. 
 
 
By stressing the scale of the surveillance, Dragnea recreated the collective recollections of 
Romanians concerning the Securitate during the Ceausescu regime. Approximately 400,000 
informants surveyed eight million people at the behest of the secret police89.  
 
 
89 Dennis Deletant, “The Securitate Legacy in Romania”, in Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: 
The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania, ed. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, Studies in Russia and East 
Europe (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001), 198, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403905369_6. 
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Image 2. Iconography depicting the tools “prosecutors” of the new Securitate/Parallel State 
Source: https://republica.ro/pe-nesimtite-cu-o-poza-sperietoare-dl-dragnea-ne-scoate-din-ue-si-din-nato 
 
Dragnea’s contextual focus is to envision the current judiciary not only as the inheritors of the 
Securitate but also of those who apply their techniques illegally under democracy. Dragnea, 
not only stressed the collective recollections but also strengthened the meaning of collective, 
as victims in the present of the same trauma as the past. Herein, Dragnea interrelated the 
mnemonic remembrance of the Securitate with the Manichean tenet, we vs. them. Stressing the 
collective is a populist framework, whereby the agent seeks to portray itself as a like-minded 
victim resembling the people. 
The second element that seeks to overlap the symbolism of the judiciary with the 
Securitate is the informants, who sedimented the notoriety of Securitate. When crystallising 
the informant context in his speech, Dragnea identified, according to populism literature, how 
the division is achieved in the present by the hands of elites: 
 
 
Stalinists and Securitate want to turn everyone into informants, to denounce, to 
accuse, to lay blame amongst ourselves for things that we didn’t do. We are urged, 
threatened, blackmailed to file complaints against relatives, friends, colleagues or 
people we have never even seen. It is an odious plan of division and hostility in 
Romanian society. But it is a cunning plan to insinuate terror. Like anyone, it can be 
taken at any time. Fear, like anyone, can always be turned into a suspect or culprit. It 
has become much too much. Indictment has ended up taking the place of evidence in 
Romania, and accusation has become the preface of a conviction – in this scenario the 
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whole of society becomes a prisoner of terror. […] Although you don’t have to be a 
suspect or a defendant to be monitored or intercepted, none of this matters. It is only 
essential for the parallel state to know what you are talking about, what you are 
thinking, what you are feeling and what you want because the more it knows, the 
stronger and more repressive it becomes; and we all become more vulnerable and 
exposed to abuse of any kind. They know this well, and they know the next thing even 
better. Everything you say, absolutely everything you say, will one day be used against 
you or someone else. 
 
In this paragraph, Dragnea recounted the mnemonic procedures of the former Securitate and 
transferred them to the judiciary, often stressing the collective “the whole of society”. To give 
more meaning to his context, Dragnea recreated the feelings that described the Securitate, i.e., 
“fear, terror”. Once again, the typical populist framework of polarisation is employed to 
differentiate between the people whose validation is sought after by the coalition to amend the 
judiciary. The regular recital of the words that describe the Securitate activities, “informants, 
denunciation, monitored, intercepted, repressive”, strengthened the mnemonic recollection of 
the people, while validating the assumption that the judiciary is the new Securitate. While 
recreating the mnemonic recollection, Dragnea moved on to define the victimisation process, 
from the personal to the collective.   
 
 
Don’t delude yourself that you don’t count. Everyone matters, because no one is off 
the radar of the parallel state. We are all targets, or we can become targets at some 
point. You must not delude yourself that only high dignitaries will be the victims of 
false accusations and evidence. Do not fool yourself that only those in public office are 
the targets of these Securitate guards; they are the targets of these executions; you 
can all become living targets of this odious system. So did those who once thought 
they were not targets. This is what we see in doctors who have been followed and 
humiliated and ridiculed. This is what we see in teachers who are being chased for a 
bouquet. This is what we see in government officials who fear that by signing a public 
deed for the good of their community, they can end their condemnation. This is what 
we see in business people who are afraid to talk to even a porter from a public 
institution, so as not to be accused of conducting politics, trafficking in influence, and 
last but not least; we see this in ordinary people who have been singled out to provide 
as an example for all Romanians of how strong they are to everyone else. Nobody is 
safe! Anyone, absolutely anyone in Romania, can be targeted by an indictment that 
would lead to an arrest or conviction. You quarrel with your neighbour; you have a 
complaint to the DNA. You have a dispute at work; you are left with a complaint to the 
DNA. If you talk to someone on the phone and it is intercepted, you immediately risk 
becoming a suspect in a criminal case, and if you are unlucky enough to meet 
someone, talk to someone, be friends with someone who is in the sights of the parallel 
state, then you will be called to become an informant to denounce your friend. 
 
  
 
 24 
The purpose of this discourse is to engender a sense of victimhood among all the people. By 
counting the professions that are the most respected in Romania, Dragnea wants the people to 
consider the petty crimes they commit as abuses of power. After that, Dragnea connects the 
category of the people, his intentional rhetoric interest, with the context of victimhood. Hence, 
by connecting contextually “government officials and businesspeople with ordinary people”, 
Dragnea seeks to interrelate the blame brought to his people’s category of interest. Dragnea’s 
strategy is to correlate the context of insecurity at the collective level by highlighting that daily 
activities are surveilled. Last, Dragnea’s strategy seeks towards the end of the rally to underline 
the democratic values that are transgressed by the judiciary.  
 
 
For them, truth does not matter; nor do your rights or your freedoms. For them, 
falsified proof matters; only an invented story, a simplified process, the deceived 
interception matter. However, I ask you, can we stop all this? Are we determined to 
end them once and for all? Are we determined to take back our democracy that was 
stolen from us? Are we ready to fight and stick with it to the end? […] We can no longer 
accept these things. We have to stop; we have to say no to abuses, no to indictments 
and no to Securitate. No more Soviet-type investigations. No more political police. 
That’s enough! 
 
Populist literature suggests that there are two components to political power, a) the type of 
actor that exercises power, and b) the power capability that the political actor mobilises as a 
support basis90. The political actor embodied by Dragnea mobilised support using the brand of 
the PSD, the biggest party in Romania, for his political benefits. Herein, Dragnea seeks support 
from the people for his interest by interrelating populist strategies with mnemonic recollections. 
Dragnea’s populist approach “constructs a vision of the past that generates the most effective 
legitimation for [his] efforts to hold power”91.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The chaotic distribution of powers in Romania after 1989 has echoes in contemporary politics. 
The Communist heritage still has repercussions for mainstream parties and its leaders. The late 
coming to terms with the Communist past in Romania facilitated a fusion between mainstream 
politics and political clientelism. The admission of Romania to the EU, fashioned on the 
principles of the rule of law, precipitated cyclical confrontations between the judiciary and the 
political class. Entrenched legal warfare between political agents and the judiciary increased 
the political instability of the country. Failed attempts to amend the judiciary or grant amnesty 
to those who exploited public funds before Romania entered the EU facilitated the emergence 
of political strongmen like Liviu Dragnea, who had ongoing legal wranglings. Dragnea shifted 
 
90 Weyland, Populism, 1:54. 
91 Bernhard and Kubik, Twenty Years after Communism, 9. 
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a mainstream party like the PSD to populism to seek public support for his own benefit. While 
nationalism has always been in the political platform of the PSD, despite being a centre-left 
party, its slide to populism and conservatism hardened the party’s new ideological positions. 
The successful results of the institutions of the rule of law, supported by positive reviews from 
the European Commission, were in antithesis with the interests of the PSD, which sought to 
obtain amnesty for its political sponsors and members. This coincided with a shift to populism 
and, later, Euroscepticism. Dragnea’s increasingly erratic populist behaviour, partly generated 
by the judiciary’s efforts to prosecute him in consecutive trials, changed the PSD’s narratives. 
Strengthened by electoral victories along ALDE, the junior coalition partner, the alliance 
spearheaded by the PSD’s status as the largest party in Romania, led a battle against the 
judiciary.  
 This chapter revealed that the political strategy strives to intermingle imported populist 
conspirational belief into the political culture. This chapter also showed that populist narratives 
could absorb mnemonic issues of the past to streamline a more coherent message to the people 
in the present. This chapter showed that people act as a catalyst in the rhetoric of populist 
actors, as they are sought by the former to validate their platform and maintain the agents’ 
power. Moreover, this chapter has shown that the past represented in populist rhetoric as a 
trauma “is an efficient way of coming to terms with the socio-economic and psychological 
constraints of the present”92. Additionally, this chapter revealed that memory could be an 
essential tool in populist rhetoric. It can be discursively portrayed during rallies to separate the 
elite from the people. Remembering the past is no longer a static performance for political 
parties; instead, its role metamorphosed under democracy. For PSD, memory was 
instrumentalised to consolidate its power in the present and design the legal basis for 
Romania’s future. 
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